![Image](img/auction.jpeg)
Introduction to Buy-k Mechanisms
We provide a short introduction to buy-\(k\) mechanisms.
Read More![Image](img/demand5.png)
Extending Results to Unit-Demand Buyers
We discuss the research direction of extending results to unit-demand buyers.
Read More![Image](img/bids.png)
Progress in the Unit-Demand Direction
We continue to discuss our progress on extending results to unit-demand buyers.
Read More![Image](img/theory.jpeg)
Computing Optimal Auctions
We discuss our progress on writing code to compute revenue-optimal auctions.
Read More![Image](img/rev2.jpeg)
Separating the Revenue-Optimal Buy-\(k\) and Buy-(\(k+1\)) Auction
We discuss our progress on proving revenue seperation between different incentive-compatible auctions.
Read More![Image](img/revc.webp)
Separating the Revenue-Optimal Buy-\(k\) and Buy-(\(k+1\)) Auction (Continued)
We discuss our continued progress on proving revenue seperation between different incentive-compatible auctions.
Read More![Image](img/last.jpeg)
Wrapping Up the Program
We discuss final steps of the project as the REU ends.
Read More© Vikram Kher's DIMACS 2022 Site. This work was carried out while I was a participant in the 2022 DIMACS REU program at Rutgers University, supported by NSF grant CCF-1852215.. Designed by HTML Codex