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Vikram Kher

Undergraduate at the University of Southern California studying Computer Science (BS) and Applied Math (BA). I'm broadly interested in Mechanism Design, Computational Social Choice, and Approximation Algorithms. In Summer 2022, I will be at the DIMACS 2022 REU working with Dr. Ariel Schvartzman on a project investigating the properties of fine-grained buy-many mechanisms in Auction Theory.

Link to Personal Website
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Introduction to Buy-k Mechanisms

05-June-2022 - 12-June-2022

We provide a short introduction to buy-\(k\) mechanisms.

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Extending Results to Unit-Demand Buyers

12-June-2022 - 19-June-2022

We discuss the research direction of extending results to unit-demand buyers.

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Progress in the Unit-Demand Direction

19-June-2022 - 26-June-2022

We continue to discuss our progress on extending results to unit-demand buyers.

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Computing Optimal Auctions

26-June-2022 - 03-July-2022

We discuss our progress on writing code to compute revenue-optimal auctions.

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Separating the Revenue-Optimal Buy-\(k\) and Buy-(\(k+1\)) Auction

03-July-2022 - 10-July-2022

We discuss our progress on proving revenue seperation between different incentive-compatible auctions.

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Separating the Revenue-Optimal Buy-\(k\) and Buy-(\(k+1\)) Auction (Continued)

10-July-2022 - 17-July-2022

We discuss our continued progress on proving revenue seperation between different incentive-compatible auctions.

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Wrapping Up the Program

17-July-2022 - 29-July-2022

We discuss final steps of the project as the REU ends.

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© Vikram Kher's DIMACS 2022 Site. This work was carried out while I was a participant in the 2022 DIMACS REU program at Rutgers University, supported by NSF grant CCF-1852215.. Designed by HTML Codex