# Designing non-manipulable tournament rules 

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## Motivation

- Consider the following tournament where all teams play against each other exactly once.

| Tournament Results |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | A | B | C | D |
| A |  | Draw | Win | Draw |
| B | Draw |  | Loss | Win |
| C | Loss | Win |  | Win |
| D | Draw | Loss | Loss |  |


| Points table |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| C | 6 |
| A | 5 |
| B | 4 |
| D | 1 |

- Suppose that the match between $A$ and $B$ was played as the last. Could they colluded so that one of them would won the tournament?


## Motivation

- It is easy to see that they could.

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| B | Loss |  | Loss | Win |
| C | Loss | Win |  | Win |
| D | Draw | Loss | Loss |  |


| Points table |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| A | 7 |
| C | 6 |
| B | 3 |
| D | 1 |

- We would like to come up with different rules to determine winners of tournaments that is "reasonable" and teams don't have any incentive to collude.


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There exists a rule that is (CC) and (2-SNM-1/3) and no better rule exists.

## Our goals

- Generally, we consider the case when $k$ teams collude:
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- There exists a rule that is (CC) and (k-SNM-2/3).
- Our goal is to improve the lower bound on $\alpha$ (if possible), for some $k \geq 3$, and find a rule that achieve this lower bound.
- We will try to come up with other reasonable ways how to relax (CC) and ( $k-$ SNM ) properties.

