



# Stadium Security In a Changing Environment


Bishwa Silwal and Mustapha Olokun  
Advisor: Dr. Christie Nelson

# Our Project

- 1. Experiments to Understand the Performance of Walk Through Metal Detectors (WTMDs)**
- 2. Walk-Through Metal Detector Data Collection at a concert venue**
- 3. Drone Detection Software Experiments at a stadium**



# Problem Statement


1. **Experiments to understand how human gait may impact WTMD detection of metallic objects**
    - Building on prior REU Work and Research
      - Walk-Through Metal Detectors for Stadium Security. (Nelson et al, 2016)
        - Experiments to understand performance of field-used WTMDs (object height, orientation, speed passing through the WTMD portal)
      - Performance of Walk-Through Metal Detectors against Curvilinear Motion (Nelson, 2017)
        - Experiments on how different walking pattern affected results of WTMDs
    - Our research assesses how different pathway motions affect the detection of metallic objects
    - Performed experiments for a single orientation, height, and metallic test object.
- 

# Problem Statement Background

## 1. Experiments to understand how human gait may impact WTMD detection of metallic objects:

### Overview:

- Create heatmaps of vulnerabilities
- Curvature in motion through WTMD
- Delay in alarm (sometimes found in prior work)
- Importance of field test in original environment
- Exploring other possible impacts
- Test items to be used correspond to NILECJ 0601.00 standards for WTMDs (to meet a certain quality level)



# Experiments on WTMDs



Typical stadium security setup:


1. Bag Check
2. WTMD/Primary Screening
3. Secondary Screening (if WTMD alarms)
4. Ticket Scanners



# Experiments on WTMDs

Walking Pathways Considered for the experiments





- Three Grid boards:
  - one before the WTMD (Grid A)
  - one on the WTMD (Grid B)
  - one after the WTMD (Grid C)
- Each grid then divided into 9 regions, and 3 grid locations are picked out from each region to list out the possible trials to compute for a particular path.

Eg: Path 1 can be


A5 -> B5 -> C5

A5 -> B5 -> C8

A5 -> B5 -> C2

·  
·





- Actual Number of combinations for a path
  - $3 \times 3 \times 3 - 6 = \mathbf{21}$
  - 6 combinations were found to be unfeasible for walking normally through the WTMD
- Total ways of passing through the WTMD, considering only 3 grid locations in each zone for a path:  $21 * 3 * 3 * 3 = \mathbf{567}$
- 5 paths. So, total number of experiments with one WTMD =  $5 * 567 = \mathbf{2835}$
- Each experiment is carried out 3 times to ensure correctness. So, total number of trials =  $2835 * 3 = \mathbf{8505}$
- Progress so far: 4 paths complete. So,  $4 * 567 = \mathbf{2268}$  paths and  $2268 * 3 = \mathbf{6804}$  trials



# Experiments on WTMDs

- How we chose the 5 walking pathways:
  - Based on idea that patrons walk in direction of their personal items placed on side of WTMD, after walking through the metal detector.
  - We experimented with many pathways which covered various regions inside and outside the metal detector.
  - Narrowing down to feasible pathways for experiment took much brainstorming and trial and error

Early iteration of some of the possible pathways

	C	1	2	3
1	B	1	2	3
	A	1	2	3
	C	1	2	3
2	B	1	2	3
	A	1	2	3
	C	1	2	3
3	B	1	2	3
	A	1	2	3
	C	1	2	3
4	B	1	2	3
	A	1	2	3
	C	1	2	3
5	B	1	2	3
	A	1	2	3
	C	1	2	3
6	B	1	2	3
	A	1	2	3
	C	1	2	3
7	B	1	2	3
	A	1	2	3


# Initial Results

- Experiment results suggested that patron movement in specific pathway motion affects detection accuracy of WTMD.
- Found interesting anomalies with certain pathways causing no detection. Lack of detection delay, WTMD results showed no delay in alarm.
- Unfeasible paths through the WTMD: 272
- Out of  $(2268 - 272) = 1996$  paths,
  - 121 cases (6%) where the metallic object was not detected at all three trials.
  - 283 cases (14%) where the metallic object was not detected at least twice.
  - 485 cases (24%) where the metallic object was not detected at least once.




# Initial Results

Pathways	Never Detected	At Least Twice Not Detected	At Least Once not detected
1	30 (1.5%)	70 (3.5%)	120 (6%)
2	32 (1.6%)	90 (4.5%)	154 (7.7%)
3	44 (2.2%)	110 (5.5%)	178 (8.9%)
4	4 (0.2%)	13 (0.7%)	33 (1.7%)
Total	121 (6%)	283 (14%)	485 (24%)



# Next Steps

- Complete all paths for a single WTMD
  - Try similar experiments on another make/model WTMD
  - Explore ways to visualize which paths are more difficult to detect
  - Analyze full results once complete
- 

## 2. WTMD Data Collection and Analysis at a Concert

- Worked with CCICADA Stadium Security Project Research Team



- Observed and collected data on WTMDs at a stadium venue

# Screening Times and Ticket Scan Data

**Primary Screening Time:** Time taken for a patron to walk through the metal detector


**Secondary Screening Time :** Time taken for additional screening in case of detection alarm by metal detector

**Ticket Scan Time:** Time taken to scan and confirm patrons' tickets after screening was complete

**693** observations were recorded for screening times and **51** observations were recorded for the ticket scan time.



# Primary Screening Results



Min: 0.280


1st Quartile: 1.380

Median: 2.160


Mean: 2.645

3rd Quartile: 3.220

Max: 27.420



# Secondary Screening Results



Min: 1.500

1st Quartile: 5.345

Median: 7.005


Mean: 8.605

3rd Quartile: 10.002

Max: 33.700

Secondary Screening vs No Secondary Screening


Secondary Screening  
9.2%




No Secondary Screening  
90.8%



# Ticket Scan Data Results



Min: 0.40  
1st Quartile: 1.80  
Median: 3.10  
Mean: 6.79  
3rd Quartile: 11.60  
Max: 29.80



# Drone Detection Software Testing

- Being that drones are a security threat to large crowd venues, drone detection systems have been tested, analyzing their consistency in detecting drones and their controllers in respects to location precision and time.
- Our team assisted in the experiments of a drone detection system for potential for use at large stadium venues.
- The system used several sensors positioned for identifying drone activity, along with associated software
- Experimentation and testing took place June 29 and July 11.
- Data collection process (for both drone and controller) included testing location detection accuracy, time for detection, and precision of detection
- Total of drone 4 controllers used along with 1 drone, with testers maneuvering through stadium parking lots.



# Acknowledgements

We thank CCICADA/DIMACS for funding our project.

We thank the members of the CCICADA Stadium Security Research Team for their support.

We would also like to thank US Air Force visiting researchers who helped us out during data collection at the stadium venue.

Our mentor Dr. Christie Nelson



# References

Nelson, Christie, Chaudhary, Vijay, Edman, John, Kantor, Paul. "Walk-Through Metal Detectors for Stadium Security." Proc. of 2016 IEEE-HST Conference. May 2016. Waltham, MA.

Nelson, Christie. "Performance of Walk-Through Metal Detectors against Curvilinear Motion." Symposium on the Technologies and Metrology of CSE. April 2017. Toronto, ON, Canada.

